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a b s t r a c t
Recently, Wang and Hu have proposed a high-density quadratic compact knapsack public-
key cryptosystem using the Chinese remainder theorem to disguise two secret cargo
vectors. The system is claimed to be secure against certain known attacks; however, it has
not been demonstrated to fulfill any provable security goals. In thiswork, we show that this
system is not secure. Exploiting the special structure of system parameters, we first show
that a candidate list for the secret modulus can be obtained by solving linear equations
with small solutions. Next, we show that with this candidate list, all other secrets can
be recovered in succession with lattice-based methods by solving certain modular linear
equations with small solutions. As a result, recovering a private key can be done in about
11 h for the proposed system parameter n = 100. We also discuss a method to thwart the
proposed attack.
© 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Recently, a quadratic compact knapsack public-key cryptosystem has been proposed by Wang and Hu [1]. The scheme
uses two secret cargo vectors A and B with a special structure such that some entries of A and B have only small factors.
These two vectors are used to make a public cargo vector F with a matrix C = (cij)2×2 by using the Chinese remainder
theorem and modular multiplication in order to scramble cargo vectors and conceal its special structure. Interestingly, this
scheme does not use a binary message. Instead, it uses a message M = (m1, . . . ,mn) with mi ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , 15} that
is encrypted into a ciphertext c such that c = ∑ni=1 fim2i , where F = (f1, . . . , fn) is a public cargo vector. Using a non-
binary message, this scheme seems resistant to low-density attacks. Other known attacks are also considered, including the
Diophantine approximation attack and the orthogonal lattice attack; however, it has not been demonstrated to fulfill any
provable security goals.
In some sense, this scheme can be viewed as a CRT-variant of a previous knapsack-based probabilistic encryption
scheme [2], where only one secret cargo vector is used and some entries have only small factors. Due to the special structure,
it is cryptanalyzed by Youssef [3], where it is shown that a short candidate list for the secret modulus can be found in
time complexity O(n3), and the private key can be retrieved in time complexity O(n7) using an attack based on lattice basis
reductions. This attack is later improved by Lee [4]where it is shown that the suggested parameters are completely insecure.
In this paper, we show that this CRT-variant is also not secure. That is, scrambling cargo vectors using a matrix and
the Chinese remainder theorem is not enough to conceal the special structure. More precisely, we present a heuristic key-
recovery attack on the scheme presented in [1] which runs in polynomial time. Our observation is that there exist some
relations among the entries of a public cargo vector F = (f1, . . . , fn) due to the scheme’s special structure. Moreover, these
relations are good enough to recover the private key within a reasonable time.
We first show that the candidate list for the secretmodulusN can be obtained using relations among fis by solving certain
multivariate linear equations with small solutions. Next we show that candidate N values can be checked and other secrets
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can be recovered with lattice-based methods finding small solutions of certain modular multivariate linear equations. We
also discuss how to thwart the proposed attack.
We note that Youssef already attacked this scheme in [5] where a heuristic stereotypedmessage attack is done to recover
the plaintext message when partial information about the original message is known. The attack in [5] does not use any
internal structure of the secret key. In contrast, we use the special property of secret cargo vectors to recover the secret key,
and decryption can be done with the obtained secret key.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review some preliminaries for understanding the
proposed attack. The key generation algorithm from the scheme presented in [1] is reviewed in Section 3. In Section 4, we
present a main observation on which our attack is based, and the proposed attack is presented with experimental results in
Section 5. Finally, Section 6 contains a brief conclusion.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we review lattices and present some facts from number theory that are used in the rest of the paper.
2.1. Notation
Throughout this paper, the following notation is used. The greatest common divisor (GCD) of two integers a and b is
denoted by gcd(a, b). For a set or list L, the cardinality or length of L is denoted by |L|. We write the binary length of an
integer a as |a|2. Finally, the smallest integer greater than or equal to r ∈ R is denoted by ⌈r⌉.
2.2. Lattices
An n-dimensional lattice is the set of integer combinations
∑n
i=1 xibi | xi ∈ Z

of n linearly independent vectors
b1, . . . , bn ∈ Rm. In this paper, we are only interested in the integer lattices such that b1, . . . , bn ∈ Zm. The set of vectors
b1, . . . , bn is called a basis for the lattice and can be represented by amatrix B, where the basis vectors are thematrix’s rows.
The lattice generated by B is denoted byL(B).
One of the most important algorithmic problems in lattices is the shortest vector problem (SVP), which is to find
the shortest non-zero vector in a given lattice. Only exponential time algorithms [6–8] are known for this problem, and
polynomial time algorithms such as LLL achieve only exponential approximation factors although they behave much better
in practice. For a small dimension, such as when n < 50, SVP can be solved efficiently by algorithms presented in [7,8].
One of the applications of lattices is in finding small solutions of (modular) linear multivariate equations. For a general
modular equation a1x1 + · · · + anxn ≡ 0(mod N), where all ais and N are known, lattice-based methods can be used to
find a small solution (x1, . . . , xn) of this equation whenever
∏n
i=1 Xi ≤ N , where X1, . . . , Xn > 0 are integers such that|x1| ≤ X1, . . . , |xn| ≤ Xn. This folklore result is justified in [9, Appendix A]. The non-modular case can also be solved under
a similar condition [10, Chapter 2].
2.3. An integer linear equation with two variables
In this section, we review how to find solutions of the integer linear equation with two variables, namely,
ax+ by = c, a ≠ 0, b > 0, (1)
in a bounded region, with (x, y) ∈ [0, X] × [0, Y ] for given X, Y ∈ N.
First, note that there exist integer solutions of (1) if and only if d = gcd(a, b) divides c. A particular solution (x1, y1) of
(1) can be computed using the extended Euclidean algorithm. The general solution is
(x, y) = (x1 + (b/d)k, y1 − (a/d)k) , k ∈ Z.
Next, we find solutions in the bounded region, [0, X]×[0, Y ]. Let f be f (x, y) = ax+by− c. Since f (x, y) = 0 is a line, for
this line to intersect with the region, at least one of f (0, 0)f (X, Y ) and f (X, 0)f (0, Y ) should be non-positive. In this case, to
find solutions in the region, we follow the procedure described below.
Let k = ⌈−(d/b)x1⌉. Then x1 + (b/d)k is near 0, and (x2, y2) = (x1 + (b/d)k, y1 − (a/d)k) is a solution near the y-axis.
From this solution, by adding (b/d,−a/d), we obtain more solutions (xi+1, yi+1) = (xi + b/d, yi − a/d) for i ≥ 2. When xi
becomes larger than X , we stop. Clearly, all (xi, yi) is a solution to (1), andwe can find all solutions in the region [0, X]×[0, Y ]
among these solutions.
Similarly, one can start from the solution near the x-axis, x = X , or y = Y . All starting points produce the same solution
set in the region, and so a choice can be made according to the given equation. This may not be the most efficient method;
however, it is adequate for our purpose.
3. Description of the encryption scheme
In this section, we describe a quadratic compact knapsack public-key cryptosystem [1]. We first describe the key
generation algorithm. For the key generation, let J consist of the following integer pairs and their reverse pairs: (1, 31),
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(1, 34), (1, 37), (1, 38), (1, 41), (1, 43), (1, 46), (1, 47), (1, 53), (1, 58), (1, 59), (1, 61), (1, 62), (1, 67), (1, 68), (1, 71), (1, 73),
(1, 74), (1, 76), (1, 78), (1, 79), (1, 82), (1, 83), (1, 86), (1, 87), (1, 89), (1, 92), (1, 93), (1, 94), (1, 97), (2, 17), (2, 19), (2, 23),
(2, 29), (2, 31), (2, 34), (2, 37), (2, 38), (2, 39), (2, 41), (2, 43), (2, 46), (2, 47), (3, 26), (3, 29), (3, 31), (4, 17), (4, 19), (4, 23),
(6, 13). Then two cargo vectors A and B are generated by the following algorithm.
Algorithm 1 ([1, Algorithm 2]).
1. Randomly choose n− 1 integer pairs g ′i = (g ′1i, g ′2i) ∈ J, i = 2, . . . , nwith repetition permitted.
2. Randomly choose 2(n − 1) numbers s1, . . . , sn−1 and t1, . . . , tn−1 satisfying the following requirements. (1) gcd(si, g ′1j)
= 1. (2) gcd(ti, g ′2j) = 1. (3) gcd(si, si+1) = 1. (4) gcd(ti, ti+1) = 1.
3. Let a1 = s1, b1 = t1, sn = 1, tn = 1. Compute
ai = si
n∏
j=n−i+2
g ′1j, bi = ti
n∏
j=n−i+2
g ′2j, for i = 2, . . . , n. (2)
4. Output A = (a1, . . . , an), B = (b1, . . . , bn), and exit.
It is suggested that |si|2 =
sn∏nj=2 g ′1j2 − ∏nj=n−i+2 g ′1j2 and |ti|2 = tn∏nj=2 g ′2j2 − ∏nj=n−i+2 g ′2j2. In this way,
a1, . . . , an have almost the same binary length. Similarly, b1, . . . , bn have almost the same binary length. In addition, si and
ti have the binary length,
|si|2 =
sn n−i+1∏
j=2
g ′1j

2
+ ϵ, |ti|2 =
tn n−i+1∏
j=2
g ′2j

2
+ ϵ′ for ϵ, ϵ′ ∈ {0, 1}, (3)
which is used to bound the range of si and ti during the attack procedure. Now we describe the key generation algorithm.
Key generation.
1. Randomly choose two cargo vectors A = (a1, . . . , an) and B = (b1, . . . , bn) using Algorithm 1.
2. Randomly choose a matrix C = (cij)2×2 with determinant 1 and the length of its entries upper-bounded by a constant,
that is
cij2 = O(1) and write the inverse of C as C−1.
3. Compute
Aˆ
Bˆ

=

aˆ1 · · · aˆn
bˆ1 · · · bˆn

= C

A
B

.
4. Randomly choose twoprime integers p and q slightly greater than 225
∑n
i=1 aˆi and 225
∑n
i=1 bˆi respectively, and compute
N = pq.
5. Use the Chinese remainder theorem to generate a cargo vector E = (e1, . . . , en), s.t. ei ≡ aˆi mod p, ei ≡ bˆi mod q.
6. Randomly choose an invertible integer v over ZN .
7. Compute F = (f1, . . . , fn),
fi ≡ eiv mod N.
The private key is N, p, q, C−1, and v−1 mod N , and the public key is a (permuted) vector of F , where permutation can
be used to increase security. The messageM = (m1, . . . ,mn), with mi ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , 15}, is encrypted into the ciphertext
c such that c = ∑ni=1 fim2i . For the decryption procedure, we refer to [1]. In the rest of the paper, we assume a public key
F = (f1, . . . , fn)without permutation for the convenience of presentation. Of course, permutation is considered during the
complexity analysis.
4. Main observation
We begin with a main observation that there exist small integersWi such thatW0fn +W1fn−1 +W2fn−2 +W3fn−3 = 0.
This leads to the following lemma, which is used in the first step of the attack.
Lemma 1. Let F = (f1, . . . , fn) be a public key, and let g ′ij, sk, and tk be system parameters generated by the key generation
algorithm in Section 3. Then there exist small integers Wi(≈ 2sn−3tn−3) such that
W0fn +W1fn−1 +W2fn−2 +W3fn−3 = 0. (4)
Moreover, those integers satisfy the following equations:
W0g ′12g
′
13g
′
14 +W1g ′13g ′14sn−1 +W2g ′14sn−2 +W3sn−3 = 0, (5)
W0g ′22g
′
23g
′
24 +W1g ′23g ′24tn−1 +W2g ′24tn−2 +W3tn−3 = 0. (6)
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Proof. From the key generation algorithm, we know that the following equations hold,
aˆi = c11ai + c12bi, bˆi = c21ai + c22bi
ei ≡ aˆi mod p, ei ≡ bˆi mod q
fi ≡ eiv mod N,
where C = (cij)2×2,N = pq. By the Chinese remainder theorem, there exist c ′1, c ′2 ∈ ZN such that
c ′1 ≡ c11(mod p), c ′2 ≡ c12(mod p), (7)
c ′1 ≡ c21(mod q), c ′2 ≡ c22(mod q). (8)
It follows that fi ≡ (c ′1ai + c ′2bi)v(mod N). Let G1 =
∏n
j=5 g
′
1j,G2 =
∏n
j=5 g
′
2j, αi = si
∏4
j=n−i+2 g
′
1j, and βi = ti
∏4
j=n−i+2 g
′
2j
for i ∈ {n− 3, . . . , n}. Note that |αi|2 ≈ |sn−3|2 ≈
sng ′12g ′13g ′142 and |βi|2 ≈ |tn−3|2 ≈ tng ′22g ′23g ′242.
Using (2), we rewrite fn, . . . , fn−3 as
fn ≡ v(c ′1sng ′12g ′13g ′14G1 + c ′2tng ′22g ′23g ′24G2) = v(c ′1αnG1 + c ′2βnG2)(mod N),
fn−1 ≡ v(c ′1sn−1g ′13g ′14G1 + c ′2tn−1g ′23g ′24G2) = v(c ′1αn−1G1 + c ′2βn−1G2)(mod N),
fn−2 ≡ v(c ′1sn−2g ′14G1 + c ′2tn−2g ′24G2) = v(c ′1αn−2G1 + c ′2βn−2G2)(mod N),
fn−3 ≡ v(c ′1sn−3G1 + c ′2tn−3G2) = v(c ′1αn−3G1 + c ′2βn−3G2)(mod N).
To remove G2 from the equations, we manipulate the above equations as
βn−1fn − βnfn−1 ≡ vc ′1G1(αnβn−1 − αn−1βn) = vc ′1G1Hn,n−1(mod N),
βn−2fn − βnfn−2 ≡ vc ′1G1(αnβn−2 − αn−2βn) = vc ′1G1Hn,n−2(mod N),
βn−3fn − βnfn−3 ≡ vc ′1G1(αnβn−3 − αn−3βn) = vc ′1G1Hn,n−3(mod N)
where Hi,j = αiβj − αjβi. Note that Hj,i = −Hi,j and Hi,jHk,l − Hi,kHj,l + Hj,kHi,l = 0. Similarly, by removing G1, we obtain
Hn,n−2(βn−1fn − βnfn−1)− Hn,n−1(βn−2fn − βnfn−2)
= (Hn,n−2βn−1 − Hn,n−1βn−2)fn − Hn,n−2βnfn−1 + Hn,n−1βnfn−2
= βn(Hn−1,n−2fn − Hn,n−2fn−1 + Hn,n−1fn−2) ≡ 0(mod N),
Thus,
V1 = Hn−1,n−2fn − Hn,n−2fn−1 + Hn,n−1fn−2 ≡ 0(mod N). (9)
Similarly, we can obtain the following equations:
V2 = Hn−1,n−3fn − Hn,n−3fn−1 + Hn,n−1fn−3 ≡ 0(mod N), (10)
V3 = Hn−2,n−3fn − Hn,n−3fn−2 + Hn,n−2fn−3 ≡ 0(mod N),
V4 = Hn−2,n−3fn−1 − Hn−1,n−3fn−2 + Hn−1,n−2fn−3 ≡ 0(mod N),
which means that Vi = kiN for some small ki(≈ Hj,k) ∈ Z, i ∈ {1, . . . , 4}, and k2V1 − k1V2 = 0. Now we obtain
k2V1 − k1V2 = (k2Hn−1,n−2 − k1Hn−1,n−3)fn − (k2Hn,n−2 − k1Hn,n−3)fn−1 + k2Hn,n−1fn−2 − k1Hn,n−1fn−3
= k4Hn,n−1fn − k3Hn,n−1fn−1 + k2Hn,n−1fn−2 − k1Hn,n−1fn−3
= Hn,n−1(k4fn − k3fn−1 + k2fn−2 − k1fn−3) = 0,
which means that
k4fn − k3fn−1 + k2fn−2 − k1fn−3 = 0,
since Hn,n−1 ≠ 0. Note that Hn,n−1 = αnβn−1 − αn−1βn = (tn−1g ′12 − sn−1g ′22)g ′13g ′14g ′23g ′24. Thus Hn,n−1 = 0 implies
tn−1g ′12 = sn−1g ′22. By the constraints that gcd(sn−1, g ′12) = gcd(tn−1, g ′22) = 1, tn−1g ′12 = sn−1g ′22 implies tn−1 = sn−1 and
g ′12 = g ′22 which cannot happen due to the fact that g ′1j ≠ g ′2j for all the pairs in J .
Now let d be the greatest common divisor of k1, . . . , k4. Then W0 = k4/d,W1 = −k3/d,W2 = k2/d,W3 = −k1/d
satisfies (4). The remaining Eqs. (5) and (6) can be checked by simple substitution. Note that the absolute value of Wi is
small, namely |Wi| ≈ |kj| ≈ |Hk,l| ≈ 2αkβl ≈ 2sn−3tn−3. 
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Now we are ready to describe the proposed attack.
5. The proposed attack
5.1. Description of the attack
The proposed attack is performed in several steps. Only the public key and restrictions imposed on the systemparameters
are used in this attack. In brief, we use Lemma 1 to derive a candidate list forN . Thenwe showhow to obtain g ′ij in succession.
With this obtained information, it is possible to compute all secret values.
Now we describe and explain the attack procedure step by step.
5.1.1. Step 1. Wis such that W0fn +W1fn−1 +W2fn−2 +W3fn−3 = 0
With a given public key F = (f1, . . . , fn), the attack begins by finding small integersWi such that
W0fn +W1fn−1 +W2fn−2 +W3fn−3 = 0,
which are expected to satisfy the following equations:
W0g ′12g
′
13g
′
14 +W1g ′13g ′14sn−1 +W2g ′14sn−2 +W3sn−3 = 0, (11)
W0g ′22g
′
23g
′
24 +W1g ′23g ′24tn−1 +W2g ′24tn−2 +W3tn−3 = 0. (12)
By Lemma 1, suchWis exist. To identify such integers, lattice reduction algorithms are usedwith a latticeL(B) generated
by the following matrix:
B =
1 0 0 0 Mfn0 1 0 0 Mfn−10 0 1 0 Mfn−2
0 0 0 1 Mfn−3
 ,
whereM is a large integer. The smallest vector in this lattice is expected to be (W0,W1,W2,W3, 0). We choseM to be 1010,
which seems adequate, and we used the BKZ algorithm1 implemented in NTL [11] to find the shortest vector in a lattice.
Sincewe only knowa permuted vector of a public key, lattice reduction is done for all combinations. Thus, it is done
 n
4
 ≈ n4
times, and the attack procedure continues with the vector (W0,W1,W2,W3, 0) that has the smallest norm. Given a vector,
all 4! permutations are tested in the next steps. If this does not result in the private key, the vector with the next smallest
norm should be tried. In experiments, we were able to recover the secret key using the smallest norm vector except one
case.2
In the next steps, we assume knowledge of fn, . . . , fn−3 andWis, which are expected to satisfy (11) and (12).
5.1.2. Step 2. A set of 6-tuples
In this step, we find solutions for (11). Namely, we find a set L such that L = {(g2, g3, g4, u1, u2, u3) | W0g2g3g4 +
W1g3g4u1 +W2g4u2 +W3u3 = 0}where gi ∈ K = {g | (g, g ′) ∈ J}, 0 < u1 < U1 = 2|g2|2+1, 0 < u2 < U2 = 2|g2g3|2+1, and
0 < u3 < U3 = 2|g2g3g4|2+1. The range for ui comes from the binary length of sn−i in (3).
To find such a set, for all possible values g2, g3, g4 ∈ K and u1 (0 < u1 < U1), the corresponding values u2 and u3 are
found by solving the integer linear equation:
Au2 + Bu3 + C = 0 for A = W2g4, B = W3, C = W0g2g3g4 +W1g3g4u1
in a bounded region (u2, u3) ∈ [0,U2] × [0,U3]. All integer solutions of this equation can be found using an extended
Euclidean algorithm as is explained in Section 2.3. The set L consists of all solutions with corresponding g2, g3, g4 and u1 as
6-tuples. Note that (11) and (12) have the same solutions.
5.1.3. Step 3. A set of pairs of 6-tuples
In this step, we identify solutions satisfying both (11) and (12). This means that (g ′1j, g
′
2j) ∈ J . We compute a set of pairs
L′ ⊂ L × L such that L′ = {(l1, l2) =

(g2, g3, g4, u1, u2, u3), (g ′2, g
′
3, g
′
4, u
′
1, u
′
2, u
′
3)
 | l1, l2 ∈ L and (gi, g ′i ) ∈ J} using L
obtained in the previous step. To do that, we make a partition of L indexed by (g2, g3, g4), and obtain pairs for all elements
in J × J × J . Note that these are candidates for g ′ij, sn−k, and tn−k for i ∈ {1, 2}, j ∈ {2, 3, 4}, and k ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
5.1.4. Step 4. Candidate N and g ′ij
Now we compute N and g ′ij for i ∈ {1, 2}, j ∈ {2, . . . , n} from L′. Note that we know fn, . . . , fn−3 from Step 1. With this
information, we compute a candidate N from each pair in L′. Then we try to compute all g ′ij, sn−k, and tn−k in succession
1 We used LLL_XD followed by BKZ_FPwith block size 4, δ = 0.99.
2 This case happened when the system parameter n = 50. The second smallest norm vector was used to find a secret key.
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satisfying conditions of sn−k and tn−k in (3). An incorrect candidate for N would not produce such values. Finishing this step,
we obtain N and all of g ′ij, sn−k, and tn−k. A more detailed description now follows.
Candidate N . First, note that N divides gcd(V1, V2), where V1 and V2 are from (9) and (10). We know that N is a product of
two large primes and should be larger than any fi. Thus, for a pair in L′, letN be gcd(V1, V2) divided by small prime divisors, if
it exists. If N is prime or not larger than (maxni=1 fi), wemove on to the next pair. Otherwise, we try to find the corresponding
g ′ij for i ∈ {1, 2}, j ∈ {2, . . . , n}, and we move on to the next pair if we fail. At least for one pair in L′, we succeed ifWis are
correct. Note that g ′ij, sn−k, and tn−k are already known from L′ for i ∈ {1, 2}, j ∈ {2, 3, 4}, and k ∈ {1, 2, 3}. In the following,
we now explain a method to obtain g ′ij in succession.
Let G′1i = vc ′1
∏n
j=i g
′
1j and G
′
2i = vc ′2
∏n
j=i g
′
2j. Then fn and fn−1 can be rewritten as
fn ≡ g ′12

vc ′1
n∏
j=3
g ′1j

+ g ′22

vc ′2
n∏
j=3
g ′2j

≡ g ′12G′13 + g ′22G′23(mod N),
fn−1 ≡ sn−1

vc ′1
n∏
j=3
g ′1j

+ tn−1

vc ′2
n∏
j=3
g ′2j

≡ sn−1G′13 + tn−1G′23(mod N).
Solving this system yields G′13 and G
′
23 modulo N . By definition, it is clear that
G′i(j+1) ≡ g ′ij−1G′ij(mod N). (13)
Thus, G′i4 and G
′
i5 can also be computed using g
′
i3, g
′
i4, i ∈ {1, 2}. Now in order to obtain the rest of G′ij, let us rewrite fi as
fi ≡ vc ′1si

n∏
j=n−i+2
g ′1j

+ vc ′2ti

n∏
j=n−i+2
g ′2j

≡ siG′1(n−i+2) + tiG′2(n−i+2)(mod N). (14)
In this equation, si and ti are much smaller than other values that have almost the same binary length as N . In fact, si and
ti are smaller than p and q, and they have the binary length at most
∏n−i+1j=2 g ′1j2 + 1 and ∏n−i+1j=2 g ′2j2 + 1, respectively,
according to (3). Since |siti| < pq = N, si and ti can be obtained by identifying the small solutions of this modular linear
equation using folklore lattice-based methods [9, Appendix A] as briefly reviewed in Section 2.2, if we know G′1(n−i+2) and
G′2(n−i+2). We use this modular equation (14) to obtain g
′
ij in succession.
Computation of g ′ij in succession. Let us assume that G
′
ij is known. By guessing (g
′
1j, g
′
2j) ∈ J , we can compute G′i(j+1) using (13).
Again guessing fn−j+1 in the public key F , we try to find a small solution of the equation
fn−j+1 ≡ sn−j+1G′1(j+1) + tn−j+1G′2(j+1)(mod N)
satisfying conditions in (3). If such a solution exists, the process continues with obtained values, G′i(j+1), (g
′
1j, g
′
2j), sn−j+1, and
tn−j+1. Beginning with G′i5 which can be computed from L′, we can compute all G
′
ij and g
′
ij in succession.
With respect to complexity, note that this step needs lattice reductions at most |J|n2 times for each candidate N .
5.1.5. Step 5. A private key
In this final step, the private key (C, C−1, p, q, and v−1 mod N) is computed. Since all G′ij and g
′
ij modulo N are obtained
during the previous steps, we know vc ′1 and vc
′
2 mod N , since vc
′
1 ≡ G′1(n+1) and vc ′2 ≡ G′2(n+1)(mod N). We can also
compute (c ′2/c
′
1) mod N as
c ′2/c
′
1 ≡ (vc ′2)/(vc ′1) ≡ G′2(n+1)/G′1(n+1)(mod N).
Note that c ′1 ≡ c11(mod p) and c ′2 ≡ c12(mod p) from (7). Thus, we can see that c11(c ′2/c ′1) − c12 ≡ 0(mod p). Noting
that c ′1 ≡ c21 and c ′2 ≡ c22(mod q), if we look at the above equation modulo q, it should not be zero since the determinant
of C, c11c22 − c21c12 is one. Thus we can factor N by computing the greatest common divisor,
gcd(N, c11(c ′2/c
′
1)− c12) = p.
We do not know c11 and c12, but it is O(1),3 so an exhaustive search on these values is sufficient. Likewise with an exhaustive
search, c21 and c22 are obtained using gcd(N, c21(c ′2/c
′
1)− c22) = q.
With this obtained information, the remaining secrets c ′1, c
′
2, v, and v
−1 mod N can be computed easily. After testing
with encryption and decryption, we can be sure that the private key obtained is the correct key.
In summary, fn, . . . , fn−3 are found in Step 1, and candidates for g ′ij, sn−k, tn−k for i ∈ {1, 2}, j ∈ {2, 3, 4}, k ∈ {1, 2, 3} are
obtained in Steps 2 and 3. In Step 4, using these candidates, N, g ′ij, and fk are computed. In the final step, the correct private
key (p, q, C, v, v−1 mod N) is identified.
We briefly analyze the time complexity of this attack in the next section.
3 In experiments, we set the bound of cij to be 100. For a general bound c , this step has time complexity O(c2).
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Table 1
Timing results of the proposed attack.
n # of instances Average # of candidates for N Average elapsed time in minutes
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3–5 Total
50 10 5001.6 3.13 8.1 856.08 867.31
60 10 1192.7 8.20 6.69 236.84 251.73
70 10 1208.7 17.67 5.73 330.32 353.72
80 10 728.8 33.96 5.26 314.98 354.20
90 10 709.8 57.66 4.60 248.86 311.12
100 10 1158.4 96.39 6.33 564.19 666.91
150 10 2696.3 719.73 6.18 3118.75 3844.66
200 10 544.5 2988.81 5.37 2355.36 5349.54
5.2. Complexity analysis
• Step 1. Lattice reduction of a 4-dimensional lattice is done about n4 times in this step. Since |fi|2 grows linearly with n
and lattice reduction can be done in quadratic complexity [12], the time complexity of this step is O(n6).
• Step 2. Linear equation is solved for all possible values of g2, g3, g4 ∈ K and u1 such that 0 < u1 < 2|g2|2+1 in this step.
Since g2 < 100, we must solve linear equations at most 256|K |3 times with |K | = 42. This step can be done in O(1).
• Step 3. In this step, partitioning is done in O(|L|), and obtaining a pair is done approximately in
O(|L′|) = O(|J|3(|L|/|K |3)2).4 With |J| = 100 and |K | = 42, this is O |L|2/212.4. It is difficult to guess the correct
value of |L|. However, it does not depend on n although it is large and varied from 105 to 108 in experiments. Assuming
that this is less than 108, this step can be done in O(1)which could be 240.8.
• Step 4. In this step, a candidate list LN for N is computed in O(|L′|) = O(240.8) operations. For each candidate N , lattice
reduction is done |J|n times on average. For the only correctN , lattice reduction is done |J|n2 times. Thus, lattice reduction
is done |J| |LN |n+ n2 times in this step. In experiments, |LN | varied from 1 to 33948 and the required time heavily
depended on this number. If we assume this number is O(n2), which seems to be plausible, this step can be done in time
complexity of O(n5).
• Step 5. This final step is done in constant time.
Overall, our attack works in time complexity O(n6)with heuristic assumptions for a practical value of n (≥100). Onemay
argue that for the very large key size, the proposed attack might be ineffective since it is O(n6); however, the scheme would
be inefficient also. For example, one needs very large n ≈ 280/6 ≈ 10 321 to provide comparable security to 1024-bit RSA.
In the following, we present experimental results which shows the effectiveness of the proposed attack.
5.3. Experiments
We implemented the proposed attack with n from 50 to 200. The required time for each instance is shown in Table 1.
Experiments were done on a Q9550 (2.83 GHz) using only one core. As the result shows, our attack is practical. It breaks the
cryptosystem in about 11 h for the recommended parameter n = 100. Evenwhen n = 200, the proposed attack recovers the
secret keywithin 4 days. Note that the timings heavily depend on the number of candidates forN . However, for randomkeys,
it is not too large and within reach even when n = 200 which is twice the suggested parameter. This clearly demonstrates
that this scheme is completely insecure in the current form.
5.4. Discussion
The security failure of this scheme is mainly due to the secret cargo vectors A and B. In particular, an and bn are products
of elements only in some small set K , since sn = tn = 1. If we set sn and tn to be random integers such that they are too large
to be guessed, it would be harder to attack this scheme. In fact, if sn ≈ tn ≈ 2n, our attack fails in Step 2; however, some
information about the permutation could be leaked in this case. To avoid such leakage, sn and tn should be larger than that.
Recall thatWi (≈ 2sn−3tn−3)was found satisfying
W0fn +W1fn−1 +W2fn−2 +W3fn−3 = 0
in the first step of the proposed attack. The remaining steps cannot be conducted withoutWi’s. Since lattice-based methods
allow us to find small solutions of this equation when |Wi| ≤ (maxni=1 fi)1/3, we need to make |Wi| large enough, such that
4 We assumed a uniform distribution in the first three entries of 6-tuples in L. This may not be correct; however, we believe it is reasonable for rough
estimation.
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this inequality does not hold. As is calculated in [1], g ′1ig
′
2i ≈ 60.86 for the randomly chosen key and
fi ≈ N = pq ≈ 2252

n−
i=1
aˆi

n−
i=1
bˆi

≈ 2252n2aˆnbˆn ≈ 2252n2anbn
≈ 2252n2sntn
n∏
i=2
g ′1ig
′
2i ≈ 2252n2sntn60.86n−1.
Thus, by setting sn ≈ tn ≈ 22n,

maxni=1 fi
1/3 would be smaller than sntn (< |Wi|), and the proposed attack would fail. One
drawback of this modification is that the ciphertext length increases at least 50%.
We note that random paddings should be used to thwart the stereotyped message attack in [5]. For example, a message
M can be encoded as (M ′, R)whereM ′ = M ⊕ Hash(R).
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we present a heuristic attack on a compact knapsack-based encryption scheme proposed by Wang and
Hu [1] that exploits the special property of the scheme’s secret cargo vectors and restrictions on its system parameters. Our
heuristic attack works roughly in time complexity O(n6), and in our experiment, we obtained a private key in about 11 h for
the recommended parameter of n = 100. We also discuss a method to thwart our attack.
Knapsack-based cryptosystems are quite interesting, particularly for efficiency reasons; however, it is difficult to make
secure schemes. We hope to see many secure knapsack-based cryptosystems for the future quantum era.
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